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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Where desired, this practical coercion can be transferred to the no-
ticed motion simply by appending to the notice a warning, as strongly
worded as necessary, to the effect that an order may be entered at the
hearing which will bind the notice recipient under pain of contempt of
court for failure to obey. In this way the noticed motion can assume
the desirable aspects of the show cause order while doing away with
the practical disadvantages. There remains little, if any, reason for
retaining the show cause order procedure.
In summary, the show cause order has no more legal coercive effect
as the show cause order, it eliminates the ex parte hearing, and is a less
complex procedural device. Abandonment of the show cause order,
with the two noted exceptions,' would seem to be amply justified.
C. DAVID SHEPPARD
TORTS
Warrantless Arrest. The Washington Supreme Court in the case of
Plancick v. Williamson,' has indicated that the police of this state will
receive judicial protection in suits instituted by private individuals be-
cause of arbitrary and unreasonable police action. In the Plancich
case, the court sustained the right of the police to arrest a citizen of
this state without a warrant, on the barest of circumstances support-
ing the police contention that there was probable cause for the arrest.
The Plancich case is more remarkable than other decisions of the
court on this point, since neither the court nor the police department
could decide if the facts which were relied upon to support a warrant-
less arrest of the suspect justified a suspicion that he had committed
a felony, or that he was dangerously insane. It is submitted that the
following facts, upon which the court and the police department re-
lied, support neither contention.
About 10:30 one Sunday evening, Jerry Plancich, father of Louis
Plancich, the plaintiff, came into the Olympia Police Station, and in
very erratic and broken English told the acting desk sergeant that his
son, armed with two guns, a small one and a big one, had knocked on
his bedroom door and threatened to kill him. Acting upon the com-
plaint, the sergeant and one other officer went to the Plancich home.
The officers knocked on the door but received no response. They then
looked through a window and observed Louis Plancich sitting at a
7 Note 4 supra.
1 157 Wash. Dec. 265, 357 P.2d 693 (1960).
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table in the kitchen. The house at that time was lighted by a single
candle. Louis' appearance, according to the testimony, was some-
what odd. He had a very heavy growth of beard, disheveled hair, and
was staring off into space. After shouts and threats which Louis did
not answer, the officers called the assistant chief of police who soon
arrived with additional reinforcements, including a detachment from
the fire department. Repeated demands produced no response from
Louis, who retired to his bedroom and locked his door.
The police officers entered the house through the father's bedroom
window, and from the outside of Louis' bedroom door told him to
throw out his guns and open the door, or it would be broken down.
Louis answered (his first words to the police) that he had no guns.
Thereupon the police broke a hole in the door, and released one bolt.
There was, however, a second bolt, which apparently escaped the no-
tice of the police squad. Louis released the second bolt. The police
rushed into the room, threw Louis to the floor (injuring him), hand-
cuffed him, and removed him to the Olympia Police Station. The
Plancich home was searched by the police, but no guns were found.
Louis was held in the city jail from 1:45 Monday morning until
approximately 2:00 the next afternoon, when he was removed to the
Thurston County Jail, where he remained until 6:00 p.m. the follow-
ing Wednesday. He was not allowed to communicate with persons
outside the jail until Tuesday afternoon, and persons on the outside
were not allowed to contact him. He was finally released, after a
total of 52 hours of confinement when a psychiatrist pronounced him
"grossly sane." Louis himself was required to furnish the psychiatrist
for the examination that resulted in his release. No information was
ever filed, no warrant was issued, and he was never allowed to go be-
fore a magistrate to clear his name.
Louis brought suit for false arrest and imprisonment against the
police officers responsible for the indignity. The police attempted to
justify the arrest on the ground that they had a reasonable belief that
Louis had committed a felony by threatening or attempting to kill his
father with a deadly weapon, or in the alternative that he was dan-
gerously insane. Louis' arrest was entered in the station's books on
the ground of "inv. sanity." Evidence produced at the trial revealed
that Jerry Plancich, the father, was emotionally upset because of his
wife's death the year before; that he had nightmares and imagined
that the dead would come back to haunt him; that he was addicted
to wandering away from home; and that he was excitable and senile.
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(The record does not indicate when this knowledge first came to the
attention of the police officers.)
The trial judge sitting without a jury found that the arrest and im-
prisonment were unjustified, and awarded Louis real and compensat-
ory damages (Louis had been required to undress at the police station,
and his clothes and keys were never returned to him). The supreme
court reversed.
That the police of the State of Washington have the authority to
arrest a person on reasonable suspicion of the commission of a felony
without a warrant, there can be no doubt.' When such an arrest is
made, however, the police officer must be acting under a justifiable
belief that the accused is guilty. The definition of the probable cause
that is necessary to support such an arrest has been set forth by the
court: "Proper cause for arrest has often been defined to be a rea-
sonable bound of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in believing the ac-
cused to be guilty."' The court has further elucidated the require-
ments to validate a warrantless arrest by saying:
[An officer] ... has no authority to arrest on the mere belief that a
person has been guilty of an offense, if such belief has no foundation
in fact or sufficient circumstances on which to rest, or if he unreason-
ably acts at the request of a third person who himself has a mere sus-
picion of the guilt of the one who is arrested.4
Where an officer arrests without the necessary probable cause the
arrest without the warrant is invalid,5 and the arresting officer sub-
jects himself to civil liability.6
The police not only have the power to arrest without a warrant
where there is reasonable belief that the accused has committed a
felony, but also have the power to restrain a person when they have
reasonable cause to believe that he is so mentally ill as to be danger-
ous to himself or others or to property.'
2 State v. Hughlett, 124 Wash. 366, 214 Pac. 841 (1923) ; Eberhart v. Murphy, 113
Wash. 449, 194 Pac. 415 (1920); Greenius v. American Surety Co., 92 Wash. 401,
159 Pac. 384 (1916).
8 State v. Hughlett, supra note 2, at 368, 214 Pac. at 843.
44 Aii. JuL Arrest § 48 (1936), cited with approval in Kalkanes v. Willestoft, 13
Wn.2d 127, 130, 124 P.2d 219, 220 (1942).
5 State v. Kinnear, 162 Wash. 214, 298 Pac. 449 (1931).
6 Kalkanes v. Willestoft, 13 Wn.2d 127, 124 P. 2d 219 (1942); Taylor v. Shields,
183 Ky. 669, 210 S.W. 168 (1919).
7 The appellants in the Plancich case relied upon the provisions of RCW 71.02.120
which provided: "In emergencies requiring immediate apprehension and restraint, or
at times when superior courts are not open for business, any sheriff or other police
officer, may, when he shall have reasonable cause to believe any person is so mentally
[VOL. 36
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The power to arrest or restrain without a warrant is the exception
in our constitutional form of government which seeks to establish and
protect the rights of the individual citizens.8 Normally the police offi-
cer is required to present his evidence to an unbiased magistrate who
weighs the rights of the individual citizen against the desirability of
having him incarcerated for the good of the public and the effective
enforcement of the law. If the arrest is justified in the eyes of the
magistrate, a warrant is issued, and the accused is then legally taken
into custody. To clothe the police officer with the power to make a
warrantless arrest is to take away from the individual a protection
from arbitrary and unreasonable police action. For this reason, that
power should be restricted and narrowed to those situations where it
is most obviously needed. No wider latitude should be allowed in
making an arrest without a warrant than is allowed in securing one.'
Expansion of the power to arrest without a warrant is the only step
needed to lead to police state rule.
If the consciences of the police officers or the departmental policy
and discipline are not sufficient to restrain individual police officers
from rash and unreasoned action resulting in the deprivation of pri-
vate citizens' rights, then the duty falls upon the courts. The Wash-
ington court, however, in recent years has sustained the validity of
warrantless arrests where the existence of probable cause at the time
of the arrests was doubtful. 10 The Plancicz case is an example of this
position.
ill as to be unsafe to be at large, apprehend such person without warrant, wherever
found.....
This provision was deleted by the legislature in an amendment to RCW 71.02.120
(Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 196). A new provision was added in RCW 71.03.020 which
provides: "Whenever any person becomes so mentally ill as to be dangerous to himself
or others, or to property, and to require immediate care, treatment, or restraint, any
sheriff, peace officer, superintendent, or chief medical officer in charge of a hospital
licensed by the state of Washington, who has reasonable cause to believe such is the
case, may apprehend and/or detain such person in custody for his best interest and
protection pursuant to the provisions of this chapter."
8 U.S. CONST. amend. IV, provides that the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated. The Supreme Court in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937),
held that specific guarantees in particular amendments are valid as applied to state
action through the force of the fourteenth amendment. The Court has pointed out that
the state action to which the fourteenth amendment applies includes action of state
courts and state judicial officials. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947). WAst.
CONST. art. 1, § 7, provides only that a "person shall not be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."
9 State v. Miles, 29 Wn.2d 921, 190 P.2d 740 (1948).10 In State v. Brooks, 157 Wash. Dec. 320, 357 P.2d 735 (1960), a police officer,
while questioning an occupant in a car concerning the ownership of the car, noticed
some uncuffed pants in the front seat. The officer immediately arrested the defendant
on suspicion of burglary. In State v. Smith, 156 Wash. Dec. 384, 353 P.2d 155 (1960),
the police officers had earlier investigated the scene of a burglary where a safe and
19611
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The court stated that there were two questions to be resolved: the
reasonable beliefs of the police officers concerning Louis' actions, and
their reasonable beliefs as to his mental condition. It was decided that
considering all the circumstances, including the complaint of Jerry,
Louis' odd appearance and behavior, and the obvious apprehension of
the police as evidenced by the large number of police officers, firemen,
and fire trucks present, the officers had reason to believe that probable
cause existed for the arrest on either the ground that Louis was not
safe to be at large, or that a felony had been committed. Significantly,
the court did not indicate what part of the evidence led them to either
conclusion.
The police suspected Louis of the commission of a felony (prob-
ably first degree assault, assault with a deadly weapon11) on the basis
of an uncorroborated and unsworn statement of Jerry Plancich. Noth-
ing indicates that Jerry was questioned by the police as to whether he
had in fact seen a gun (and from his own statement he could not have,
since the alleged threats were made through a closed door). The court
itself indicates that the accusation of Jerry was not sufficient to sup-
port a warrantless arrest: "We do not imply that Jerry Plancich's
statement to the acting desk sergeant should have been taken fully
and completely at face value."' 2
On arrival at the Plancich home the police officers found Louis di-
sheveled, bearded and staring into space by candle light. To find a
man in this condition may be unusual, but it has no relation to the
commission of a felony. Louis, sitting quietly in his own home, re-
fused to answer the shouts of the police officers (a man is privileged
to resist an unlawful arrest'3), but he made no attempt to run away
or escape. It is difficult to see how the court could conclude that this
was a circumstance indicating that Louis had committed a felony.
power tools, including a red power lawn mower, had been stolen. Later that same day
the same officers acted in response to a complaint by a Mr. Fruetal that he had been
awakened by loud noises coming from his neighbor Tomlin's home. Fruetal reported
the noises sounded like someone pounding on a safe. The police officers went to the
Tomlin home and noticed a new red law mower in the garage. Apparently no effort
was made to establish whether it was the stolen item. They found the defendant Smith
asleep in a house trailer near the garage and arrested him immediately. In State v.
Young, 39 Wn.2d 910, 239 P.2d 858 (1952), a police officer, acting in response to a
general description of a robbery suspect broadcast over the police radio, arrested the
defendant for driving in the general vicinity of the robbery in an automobile of the
same make and color of the getaway vehicle. No effort was made to establish a con-
nection between the defendant and the robbery.
," RCW 9.11.010.
12 157 Wash. Dec. 265, 272, 357 P.2d 693, 697 (1960).
Is State v. Rousseau, 40 Wn.2d 92, 241 P.2d 447 (1952).
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From the police officers' description of Jerry Plancich, they could
well expect that his son also would be somewhat unusual. Louis looked
odd to the police officers peeping through the windows of the Plancich.
home. The police had every reason to expect that Louis' behavior
would be odd.
The presence of a large number of highly excited police officers and
firemen with trucks (as noted twice by the court in its opinion) does
not add to the existence of probable cause for believing Louis Plan-
cich had committed a felony, or that he was dangerously insane, since
the onslaught of police and firetrucks upon the scene was a result of
the police department's hasty and inaccurate judgment of the situa-
tion. The police should not be allowed to establish probable cause for
a warrantless arrest simply by calling in reinforcements, including the
fire department and their trucks.
Louis' conduct was odd, but eccentricity is not a crime, nor does it
indicate that the eccentric has committed a crime. All that can be
said is that Louis did not conform to the general standard of neatness,
cleanliness, and electric lighting. But in the United States Louis has
the right to be eccentric, and he should not be more subject to arrest
because of it.
As to Louis' arrest on the charge of being dangerously insane, there
is nothing in the record to indicate that he was in such a mental state.
His actions endangered no one. No emergency existed that would
justify an arrest under the statute in force at that time. 4
The extraordinary power to arrest without a warrant should be held
only to those occasions where it is most needed. Not only are the
rights of individual citizens at stake (particularly the right to be an
individual), but effective law enforcement is involved. Under our sys-
tem of government, where the police are not clothed with plenary
powers, effective police protection depends to a large extent upon the
cooperation of the public. If the police are allowed to lawlessly take
from the people those rights which the police are employed to protect,
and if they are not held responsible for their foibles, the public -will
lose faith in the police, disrespect for police action will increase, and
indifference or outright hostility will result, all at the cost of effective
police protection.
The supreme court's justification of Louis Plancich's arrest because
he looked and acted odd gives the police of this state judicial permis-
sion to arrest an eccentric person on the basis of a complaint from an
14 See statutes cited, note 7 supra.
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uncorroborated witness who need not be reliable. To reach this result
the court overruled the verdict of the trial judge who heard the testi-
mony given by the parties. When there is no conflict in the evidence,
the question of probable cause for arrest is one of law, and the su-
preme court can decide the question.1" But the question of whether
probable cause existed is one that is unsupported by a history of judi-
cial precedents. Each case is decided on its own facts and merits. The
trial judge who presides at the taking of the evidence is in the best
position to make legal determinations which are controlled wholly by
the facts of the particular case. The procedure of the Washington
court in the past has been to give weight to the trial judge's findings."
The court further decided that if the arrest of Louis was justified,
his 52 hour incarceration (the first approximately 30 hours of which
were incommunicado) without being taken before a magistrate or for-
mally charged was also justified. The majority made no mention that
the period of incommunicado incarceration was absolutely illegal."
The decision of the court refusing to sustain the right of an indi-
vidual to be free from, and to obtain redress for, arbitrary and un-
reasonable police action cannot fail to destroy public confidence in
the police and consequently reduce efforts toward cooperation between
police and public. As a result the police will have to lean even more
heavily upon unreasonable actions to achieve that same standard of
effective protection that they could attain with the full cooperation of
the public. This decision places too high a price upon the police pro-
tection in this state.'8
DALE KREMER
15 Eberhart v. Murphy, 113 Wash. 449, 194 Pac. 415 (1920).
16 State v. Green, 43 Wn.2d 102, 260 P.2d 343 (1953).
17 RCW 9.33.020. Rosellini, J., in his dissenting opinion points out the illegality of
this procedure on the part of the Olympia Police Department.
18 A federal remedy for damages is open to Louis Plancich as provided in Rev. Stat.
§ 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958), which provides: "Every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
The United States Supreme Court has held that the guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures contained in the fourth amendment has been made applicable to
the states by reason of the fourteenth amendment. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1948). In Monroe v. Pape, 81 Sup. Ct. 473 (1961), the Court, in a situation similar
to the Plancich case, held that the petitioner stated a cause of action under the federal
statute set out above. The Court declared that acting "under color of any state statute,
ordinance..." includes misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with authority of law; and that it is
no defense to say that the actions were in fact violations of state law.
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Contributory Negligence-Absolute Right to Stop at a Yellow
Light. The effect to be given to a yellow traffic signal, often perplexing
to the driver who faces one while approaching an intersection, was
recently considered by the Washington Supreme Court. It would not
be surprising to the average driver that the court divided five to four
when it made the decision that a driver has an absolute right to stop
at a yellow light, and could not be negligent in doing so.
The pronouncement was made in the case of Brummett v. Cyr,'
which arose from a rear-end collision at a traffic-light controlled inter-
section in Yakima. The streets were covered with packed snow and
ice. As the plaintiff approached the intersection, the traffic signal
changed from green to yellow. The plaintiff, desiring to test how
effectively his just-mounted snow tires would stop his car,' applied his
brakes and made a sudden stop with all but two and one-half feet of
his car beyond the intersection crosswalk. The defendant's car could
not stop and rammed the rear end of the plaintiff's car. The jury found
for the defendant, but the supreme court reversed, agreeing with the
plaintiff's contention that it was error to submit the issue of contribu-
tory negligence to the jury. The court held as a matter of law that the
forward driver could not be negligent in stopping at a yellow light. The
decision was made under the Yakima city ordinance which provides:
2. Yellow alone or the word "Caution" when shown following green
or "Go" signal: Vehicular traffic facing the signal is thereby warned
that the red or stop signal shall be exhibited immediately thereafter,
and such vehicular traffic shall not enter or be crossing the intersection
when the red or stop signal is exhibited.s
Both the majority and minority opinions interpret the ordinance to
give a driver an option upon display of the yellow light. He may pro-
ceed through the intersection if he can do so before the light turns red,
or he may stop. If he exercises his right to stop, the majority would
allow him to do it without consideration of following vehicles. The
1 156 Wash. Dec. 919, 355 P.2d 994 (1960).
2 "Under ordinary circumstances I might have went [sic] through that light ... I
just got a new set of snow tires put on my car ... I just wanted to see if I could stop
the whole car." Brummett v. Cyr, supra note 1, at 923, 355 P.2d at 996.
3 Yakima, Wash. Ordinance No. B-1526, ch. V, § 24(a). This ordinance is taken
verbatim from RCW 46.60230 (1951). This is the usual procedure in adopting city
traffic codes. Seattle, Wash. Ordinance 80998, art. V, § 33 (1952), in effect at the time
of the accident was identical. But notice that RCW 46.60.230 was amended in 1959
and now reads in part: "However, if such stop cannot be made in safety, a vehicle may
be driven cautiously through the intersection." SEA=E, WAsH., CODE § 21.20.082
(1959) has now adopted this wording.
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absolute right to stop is not reasoned from the statute. That result,
which is decisive of the case, is merely stated.
The minority argued that both the forward and the following driver
have a duty to operate their car in a reasonable and prudent manner.4
Even when exercising an "absolute right" to stop in compliance with
the law, the minority felt that the circumstances may have been such
that the compliance does not fulfill the statutory standard of reason-
able care,' and that the jury rightly was given the determination of the
factual issue of the exercise of due care by the plaintiff.
The rule in Washington governing vehicles traveling in the same
direction is that the following driver has the duty of avoiding a colli-
sion. "In the absence of an emergency or unusual conditions, he is
negligent if he runs into the car ahead."6 Thus, while the following
driver is presumed to be negligent, he is not an insurer to be held liable
in every rear-end accident.
The defendant attempted to escape liability by employing the
emergency doctrine,' arguing that the sudden stop of the plaintiff
created an emergency which relieved the defendant from the standard
of care just as when he had adequate time for reflection. The court
properly dismissed this argument by stating that the driver of a for-
ward vehicle does not create an emergency when he stops at a yellow
light. The following driver must be cognizant of the traffic signal and
must anticipate that the forward driver may stop on an amber light.8
4 RCW 46.48.010 provides: "Every person operating or driving a vehicle of any
character upon the public highways of this state shall operate the same in a careful and
prudent manner ....
5 "It must be borne in mind that statutory regulations relative to the conduct of
drivers of motor vehicles do not attempt to define what reasonable care is. They set
up certain rules of conduct, violation of which carries a presumption of negligence, but
a compliance with which does not necessarily fulfill the obligation to exercise reason-
able care under given circumstances." Curtis v. Perry, 171 Wash. 542, 547, 18 P2d
840, 843 (1933).
6 Miller v. Cody, 41 Wn.2d 775, 778, 252 P.2d 303, 305 (1953) ; Tackett v. Milburn,
36 Wn.2d 349, 218 P.2d 298 (1950). Yakima, Wash., Ordinances, tit. X, ch. 10-21,
§ 383: "Spacing when in motion. It shall be unlawful for the operator of a motor
vehicle to follow more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for
the speed of the vehicle and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway." This
is copied from RCW 46.60.080.
The best statement of the emergency doctrine in this context is in Kelly v. Kittitas
County, 29 Wn.2d 383, 395, 187 P.2d 297, 303 (1947) : "[A]n automobile driver who,
by the negligence of another and not by his own negligence, is suddenly placed in a
situation of emergency and compelled to act instantly to avoid a collision or injury, is
not guilty of negligence if he makes such a choice as a person of ordinary prudence
placed in such a position inight make, even though he did not make the wisest choice
or one that would have been required in the exercise of ordinary care, but for the
emergency."
8 This argument for the emergency doctrine would appear to have greater validity
when an abrupt stop is made without any hand signal at a place other than a controlled
intersection. For a comprehensive discussion of the duty of the forward driver to
signal before stopping, see Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 5 (1953).
[VOL. 36
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Thus, it would appear that at a traffic-light controlled intersection, the
following driver may not escape the presumption of negligence under
the present facts, and would be barred from recovering damages from
the forward driver. It is the question of whether the forward driver
also may be barred from obtaining damages by stopping in a negligent
manner which caused the division of the court. The position of the
majority that the following driver may not claim that the other was
contributorily negligent in his method of stopping is unsupported by
citation in the opinion and difficult to support under principles of
tort law.
It has been dearly stated that contributory negligence or assumption
of risk are defenses to negligence per se.9 One doing an act which he
has an absolute right to do would seem to be barred from recovery for
injury from the negligence of another, if he performs the act without
due regard to the safety of others or to his own safety, just as he would
be barred if he had assumed the risk of injury. One would suspect that
had the plaintiff been towing the defendant, had he jammed on his
brakes at the yellow light, and had he been hit from behind because
the defendant negligently failed to apply his brakes, the plaintiff would
be unable to collect damages. Even though he had an absolute right
to stop, he would have assumed the risk 0 of a rear-end collision. In
addition, the same duty of reasonable care owed to other drivers would
be owed to a paying passenger in the car," for if, in exercising this
absolute right to stop, he failed to use reasonable care toward his pas-
senger, he would generally be liable to the passenger. 2 Thus, the
negligence of the forward driver would not necessarily have to rest on
violation of a duty to watch out for following drivers.' It would be
based on whether the forward driver met his duty of due care under
the circumstances. If the jury could have found that reasonably pru-
9 Skarpness v. Port of Seattle, 52 Wn.2d 490, 326 P.2d 747 (1958), noted, 34 WAsHr.
L. Ray. 252 (1958).
10 The distinction between assumption of risk and volenti non fit injuria remains as
enunciated in Walsh v. West Coast Coal Mines, 31 Wn2d 396, 197 P.2d 233 (1948).
The result would be the same whether or not a contractual relationship existed.
11 The same analogy could be made with a guest, when the driver did not meet the
standard of care required by the guest statute.
12 Annot., 65 A.L.R. 952, 954 (1930).
13 The majority indicates that "intolerable confusion as to one's duty would result
from requiring a forward driver to watch out for following vehicles." Brummett v.
Cyr, 156 Wash. Dec. 919, 921, 355 P2d 994, 995 (1960). The court did not refer to the
statement in Curtis v. Perry, 171 Wash. 542, 547-48, 18 P.2d 840, 843 (1933), which
states that "while the paramount duty of the driver of a motor vehicle is to keep a
lookout ahead, and while he may assume that drivers of vehicles following from the
rear will observe the laws of the road, he cannot entirely ignore such vehicles. This is
merely a more general statement of reasonable care . . ." (Emphasis added.)
1961]
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dent person knowing of traffic behind him; knowing of the slick, icy
streets; and knowing that an extremely abrupt stop would have to be
made, would have proceeded through the intersection, it would appear
that the defendant would have been entitled to have the issue sub-
mitted to the jury."
The determination that there is an absolute right to stop at a yellow
light appears incongruous with Washington holdings that the right of
way granted by RCW 46.60.15015 is not an absolute right, but rather
must be exercised with due regard to the circumstances. The favored
driver must exercise due care after he realizes, or should have realized,
that the disfavored driver is not going to yield the right of way.1" The
right to assume that the right of way will be yielded does not excuse
the driver from the consequences of his own contributory negligence."
Interestingly, the driver with the right of way may be negligent by
deceiving the disfavored driver into thinking he has relinquished the
right of way, and then by continuing into the intersection, causing a
collision.18 One wonders whether a driver might not deceive a follow-
ing driver into thinking he was going to proceed through the inter-
section.
It should be noted, too, that Washington follows the usual rule that
there is no absolute right to proceed on a green light. Here again, there
is a right to comply with the traffic signal only if it is with due care
under the circumstances. 9 Some distinction by the court would have
been helpful as to why the standard of due care is present when re-
sponding to a green light, but is not necessary when responding to a
yellow light.
14 De Koning v. Williams, 47 Wn.2d 139, 141, 286 P.2d 694, 695 (1955). See also
5 Am. JUR. Automobiles § 317: "A motorist who has approached an intersection in a
lawful and reasonable manner at a time when a traffic signal was in his favor is under
no duty to come to a stop upon a change of the signal after he has entered the inter-
section or when he is so close that he cannot safely stop, but instead has the right and
even the duty of proceeding through the intersection." (Emphasis added.) But see
Bass v. Stockton, 236 S.W2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
15 "Every operator of a vehicle on approaching highway intersections shall look out
for and give the right of way to vehicles on his right . . . whether his vehicle first
reaches and enters the intersection."
16 Bos v. Dufault, 42 Wn.2d 641, 257 P.2d 775 (1953) ; Bennett v. Karnowsky, 24
Wn.2d 487, 166 P.2d 192 (1946) ; Finical v. McDonald, 185 Wash. 121, 52 P.2d 1250
(1936) ; See also Comment, The Duty of the Favored Driver under the Right of Way
Statute to Maintain a Reasonable and Proper Lookout, 29 WASH. L. REv. 73, 78
(1954).
17 Sebastian v. Rayment, 42 Wn.2d 108, 254 P.2d 456 (1953); contra, Morris v.
Bloomgren, 127 Ohio 147, 187 N.E. 2 (1933).
18 Key v. Reiswig, 55 Wn.2d 512, 348 P.2d 410 (1960) ; Smith v. Laughlin, 51 Wn.
2d 740, 321 P.2d 907 (1958).
19 Lanegan v. Crauford, 49 Wn.2d 562, 304 P.2d 953 (1956).
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Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the problem is the future
application of the rule laid down by the majority, inasmuch as three
years after the accident RCW 46.60.230 was amended to read:
Yellow alone or the word "Caution," when shown following the
Green or "Go" signal: Vehicular traffic facing the signal shall stop
before entering the nearest crosswalk at the intersection or at such
other point as may be designated by the proper traffic authority. How-
ever, if such stop cannot be made in safety, a vehicle may be driven
cautiously through the intersection.
20
It is unfortunate for those with academic interests that counsel for the
defendant did not call this amendment to the attention of the court,
for it raises the involved and interesting question of its retrospective
application to a previous accident.2 '
The ordinances of most cities now vary from the current state
statute. But, RCW 46.08.020 allows local authorities to adopt traffic
rules and regulations only when they are not in conflict with the state
statutes. In City of Bellingham v. Sclampera, 2 a case of first impres-
sion decided after the Brummett case, the court held that A city traffic
ordinance was not in conflict with the state statute and was valid. The
contention was that RCW 46.56.010, by making it ". . . unlawful
for any person who is under the influence of . . . liquor . . . to
drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle upon the public
highways" precluded a city from passing ordinances against the same
offense. The court cited cases showing a division of authority on pre-
emption by state statutes and adopted what they considered the better
reasoned position, which upholds such ordinances as not preempted
20 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 135 § 1. The traffic code of the City of Seattle was
amended in 1959 to adopt the wording of the state statute. SEATTLE, WAsH., CODE §
21.20.082 (1959).
21 The general rule that laws will not be applied retrospectively appears riddled with
exceptions. Some authorities speak of an exception when the statute effects a remedy
only, as opposed to a right. E.g., Hammack v. Monroe Street Lumber Co., 54 Wn.2d
224, 237, 339 P2d 684, 691 (1959) (dissent). Other cases indicate that when a tort
action may be brought only by virtue of a statute, there can be no vested right therein
prior to final judgment, and that the legislature may take away the right at any time.
Hansen v. West Coast Wholesale Drug Co., 47 Wn.2d 825, 289 P2d 718 (1955);
Robinson v. McHugh, 158 Wash. 157, 291 Pac. 330 (1930). For an excellent discus-
sion of the status of retroactivity in Washington as affected by the Haminack case, see
Note, 35 WASH. L. REv. 237 (1960). It would be expected that the amended statute in
the instant case would fall within the general rule of prospective application, for it
would appear to deal with the substantive rights of the parties, in this case determining
whether the common law defense of contributory negligence is available. It could also
be argued that the statute has effected no change in requiring the driver to proceed
through the intersection, for the wording of the statute is permissive only. This may
be countered by the requirement of stopping before entering the crosswalk.
22 157 Wash. Dec. 1, 356 P.2d 292 (1960).
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by state law, though they operate concurrently." The court adopted
the test of the Utah court which stated:
In determining whether an ordinance is in "conflict" with general
laws, the test is whether the ordinance permits or licenses that which
the statute forbids and prohibits and vice versa .... Judged by such a
test, an ordinance is in conflict if it forbids that which the statute
permits. . . . Unless legislative provisions are contradictory in the
sense that they cannot coexist, they are not to be deemed inconsistent
merely because of mere lack of uniformity in detail. 24
The court concluded that by RCW 46.08.020 the state had not pre-
empted the field and that the ordinance was not in conflict with the
statute.2
While the court has recognized a need for local autonomy in the
traffic control field, the Yakima ordinance as construed by the court in
the Brummett case appears to license that which is prohibited by the
amended RCW 46.60.230. The state law now requires that a driver
faced with a yellow light stop before he reaches the crosswalk, which
the plaintiff could not do in the Brummett case. The ordinance was
interpreted as allowing the driver to stop, even though he had passed
the crosswalk, as had Brummett. The ordinance thus would appear to
be invalid, having been preempted by the new state law.2" If a driver
is unable to stop safely, the amended statute allows him to proceed
cautiously through the intersection. This provides an additional argu-
ment that the legislature had anticipated that a stop at a yellow light
may create an unsafe situation, which may require the driver to cau-
tiously proceed through the intersection to meet the standard of due
care.
2 7
23 For an excellent discussion of the problem in other jurisdictions, see Rhyne,
Statutory Construction in Resolving Conflicts Between State and Local Legislation,
3 VAND. L. REv. 509 (1950).
24 Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 119, 93 P.2d 671, 673 (1939).
25 The court also found that the state has preempted the licensing field by statute;
hence a city cannot revoke a motor vehicle operator's license. However, penalties pro-
vided by a city ordinance in excess of those allowed by the state statute do not make
the entire ordinance invalid. The penalties may be enforced up to the extent that they
are within the statutory limitations.
26 It may be expected that city ordinances will be changed to adopt the amendments
to the State Motor Vehicle Act as they have in the past. See SEATTLE, WASH., CODE,
§ 21.20.082 (1959). An additional problem of interpretation remains in the amended
act. It is not clear to whom the term "with safety" applies. When the driver must
stop before he reaches the crosswalk, it could be argued that it must apply only to the
driver himself, or to following cars. It is usually directed toward the situation where
the driver cannot stop without entering the intersection, creating an unsafe situation
for cars approaching from intersecting streets.
27 It must be remembered, however, that the statute is only permissive, not man-
datory.
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The Brummett case appears to be an example of substitution by the
court in a civil action of the standard of a criminal statute for the
reasonably-prudent-man criterion of tort law.2 It may be appropriate
for the court to utilize the amended statute as a vehicle to return to
the due-care standard as a basis for determining contributory negli-
gence in intersectional accidents.
WALTER C. HowE, JR.
Warning Lights on the Highway-Absolute Duty v. Reasonable
Measures. The standard of "the reasonably prudent man in the same
or similiar circumstances" is often used by courts in formulating in-
structions to juries.' That standard is particularly appropriate to guide
juries in their determinations of the negligence and contributory negli-
gence issues involved in tort actions. However, in Albert v. Krause,2
the Washington Supreme Court refused to follow the common practice,
rejecting a jury instruction that was expressed in those terms.
The Albert case was a wrongful death action brought by the widow
of the deceased, on behalf of herself and her two minor children. The
decedent's death resulted from the nighttime collision of his vehicle
with the defendant's stalled truck and trailer, which was obstructing a
state highway. About three hours after dark, the defendant entered the
twenty-two-foot highway from a side road, driving a truck and thirty-
three-foot trailer. While turning onto the highway, the defendant's
truck stalled, so that the truck and trailer completely obstructed the
paved portion of the highway. Less than two minutes after the truck
had initially stalled on the highway, the defendant noticed the ap-
proaching headlights of the decedent's Volkswagen panel truck. The
defendant's companion left the truck and ran down the highway about
28 For an interesting discussion of the application of standards of criminal statutes
to civil actions, see Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49
COLUmf. L. REv. 21 (1949). He concludes at 47: "Often ... a criminal proscription
operates as a desirable, more exact standard that smooths up civil procedure. Never-
theless there are many situations in which substitution of the criminal proscription for
the reasonably-prudent-man criterion effects substantive change-either because the
particular case entails special facts or because the judgment of the legislature is mis-
guided."
"On the whole the rules of accident law are so formulated as to give the jury con-
siderable scope in deciding what the parties should have done, in each specific case, as
well as what they did do. The cardinal concept is that of the reasonably prudent man
under the circumstances. . . ." James, Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence
Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667, 676 (1949).
2 156 Wash. Dec. 748, 355 P.2d 327 (1960).
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four hundred feet, waving a flashlight with a green plastic shield," in
an attempt to warn the approaching driver of the fact that the roadway
was obstructed. The deceased merely swerved around him without
decreasing his rate of speed and drove into the side of the trailer.
Evidence at the trial indicated that the deceased was traveling at a
lawful rate of speed at the time of the accident. The opposing counsel
differed in their statements of fact as to the exact position of the
defendant's truck and trailer on the roadway. The respectively alleged
positions made it either possible or impossible for the deceased to have
seen some of the various lights on the truck. The case was submitted
to a jury who returned a verdict in favor of the defendant.
The plaintiff appealed to the supreme court, citing the following
instruction as the sole assignment of error:
You are instructed, as a matter of law, that one driving outside cities
and towns can assume that the traveled portion of the road ahead of
him is unobstructed and safe for travel, unless he receives such warn-
ing as would cause an ordinarily careful and prudent person to be
placed on notice that such road may be obstructed.4 (Emphasis added.)
The Washington Supreme Court, in a 5 to 4 decision, with the ma-
jority opinion written by Judge Rosellini, reversed the trial court for
having granted the instruction. The court held that the trial judge
erred in not granting the instruction proposed by the plaintiff, which
contained a more rigid standard of care than the reasonable man
standard embodied in the rejected instruction. The instruction pro-
posed by the plaintiff and upheld by the supreme court was a follows:
You are instructed as a matter of law that one driving at night out-
side cities and towns, in the absence of a light to warn him to the con-
trary, can assume that the traveled portion of the road ahead of him
is unobstructed and safe to travel.5 (Emphasis added.)
The court cited Bailey v. Carver6 as a precedent for granting the
instruction requested by the plaintiff. The instruction in the Bailey
3 The appellant placed great emphasis on this fact. The shield was a cylindrical
piece of plastic attached to the lighted end of the flashlight, but it did not interfere
with the beam of light emitted. The appellant contended that even if the deceased had
seen the light, he would have seen a green light which can normally be interpreted as
a signal to proceed. The respondent contested the validity of the appellant's contention,
and also noted that no such theory had been advanced by the plaintiff during the trial.
But the appellant was apparently successful, because the court noted his contention and
agreed with it at 156 Wash. Dec. 748, 751-52, 355 P.2d 327, 330 (1960).
4 Albert v. Krause, 156 Wash. Dec. 748, 749, 355, P.2d 327, 328-29 (1960).
5 Id. at 749, 355 P.2d at 329.
6 51 Wn.2d 416, 319 P.2d 821 (1957).
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case was almost identical to the instruction proposed by the plaintiff,
the only difference being that the proposed instruction used the word
"light" rather than "red or other light" as was used in the Bailey in-
struction. The dispute in that case was whether a red light was the
only legally sufficient warning of an obstruction in the roadway. The
court rejected the contention that the warning must be by a red light,
and upheld the validity of warnings by lights which were not red.' It
appears implicit in that decision that the court was concerned with a
case in which the only possible warnings were lights, and thus in the
absence of light one driving outside a city at night could assume the
highway was unobstructed. The question of the effectiveness or valid-
ity of warnings given by means other than by lights was not considered
by the court in the Bailey case. Thus the problem presented by the
granted instruction in the Albert case, which permitted the jury to con-
sider factors other than lights in determining the effectiveness of a
warning, was not present nor was it considered in reaching the decision
of the Bailey case. The court in the Albert decision implicitly recog-
nized that due to a lack of such consideration in the Bailey case the
mere citation of the case would not be a sufficient basis for rejecting
the instruction granted by the trial judge.
The court then discussed the rule that constituted the underlying
basis for the Bailey decision, that is the rule giving a nighttime driver
the right to assume that the highway ahead of him is unobstructed and
safe for travel unless he is warned to the contrary. In Washington this
rule apparently originated in Morehouse v .Everett,' which was quoted
by the court in its opinion. The court's reliance on the Morehouse case
is some what ironic, as that decision involved the rejection of a rigid
standard while the present case involves the maintenance" or formula-
tion of such a standard. In the Morehouse decision the court refused
to adopt the rule that a driver must operate his car so that he can stop
within the radius of his headlights, and stated the applicable rule as
follows:
7 The plaintiff's contention that the light had to be red was based upon Greisen v.
Robbins, 36 Wn2d 64, 216 P.2d 210 (1950). In that opinion the court cited Morehouse
v. Everett, 141 Wash. 399, 252 Pac. 157 (1926) and Coins v. Washington Motor Coach
Co., 34 Wn2d 1, 208 P.2d 143 (1949), as authorities for the requirement that the
warning light must be red. The court in the Bailey decision simply stated that the
Morelhuse and Coih cases recognized the possibility of having lights which were not
red.8 141 Wash. 399, 252 Pac. 157 (1926).
9 It may be considered to be the maintenance of the standard requiring that warn-
ings could be effective only if given by lights. That is, interpreting Bailey v. Carver,
as precluding all other forms of warnings from being considered as legally sufficient.
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One driving at night has at least some right to assume that the road
ahead of him is safe for travel, unless dangers therein are indicated by
the presence of red lights; . . . . We believe that, generally speaking,
where the statutes or the decisions of the courts require red lights as
a warning of danger on any object in the highway and such lights are
not present, it is a question for the jury to determine whether the
driver at night should have seen the obstruction, notwithstanding the
absence of red lights.'0 (Emphasis added.)
The court has relied upon the first sentence of that statement in sub-
sequent cases" to establish a requirement that a warning to be legally
sufficient must have been given by either a red or other colored light.
But the majority opinion in the Albert case recognized the possibility
of effective warnings being given by means other than lights, as was
referred to in the italicized portion of the proceding quotation from
the Morehouse case. That recognition is evidenced by the following
statement from the Albert case:
If there are not red lights so placed as to warn of the presence and
position of the obstruction, and its presence is not otherwise revealed,
other users of the highway at night are entitled to assume that it is
unobstructed.2 (Emphasis added.)
Although the majority opinion recognized the possibility of other forms
of warnings, the court then proceeded to ignore that possibility by
holding that it was error to refuse an instruction which did not con-
tain that qualifying phrase.
In the Albert case the court interpreted this "right to assume" as
meaning that the assumption that the highway is safe must be over-
come by a warning light which is sufficient in fact to inform the driver
that the road is obstructed. The instruction granted by the trial judge
provided that a warning was sufficient if it placed the driver on notice
that the road may be obstructed. The court stated, " . . . a user of
the highways is always warned that they may be obstructed, for the
possibility is inherent in the use to which highways are put and for
which they are designed.""3 From that basis the court contended that
10 Morehouse v. Everett, 141 Wash. 399, 408-09, 252 Pac. 157, 160 (1926). When
the court rejected the "headlight rule," there were a number of jurisdictions following
it, and a few cases indicated that Washington was one of them. See Annot., 58 A.L.R.
1482, 1493 (1929).
11 Bailey v. Carver, 51 Wn.2d 416, 319 P.2d 821 (1957); Greisen v. Robbins, 36
Wn.2d 64, 216 P.2d 210 (1950); Coins v. Washington Motor Coach Co., 34 Wn.2d 1,
208 P.2d 143 (1949) ; O'Neil v. Gruhn, 197 Wash. 557, 85 P.2d 1064 (1938).
"2Albert v. Krause, 156 Wash. Dec. 748, 752, 355 P.2d 327, 330 (1960).
18 Id., at 750, 355 P.2d at 329.
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the "may be obstructed" instruction effectively deprived the driver of
the benefit of the rule providing him with the right to assume. The
court failed to draw the distinction which juries would be certain to
draw under the disputed instruction. That is, that there is a difference
between the vague, ever present possibility that some part of the high-
way may be obstructed and the immediate probability that a specific
portion of the highway may be obstructed. In light of that difference,
the utilization of the standard of the reasonably prudent driver would
not result in a deprivation of the "right to assume" but merely the
imposition of a reasonable restriction upon that right.
The court apparently overlooked the statement in the Morehouse
case that, ". . . if it [the rule requiring one to drive so that he is able
to stop with the radius of the car's headlights] holds that he must see
any object which an ordinarily prudent driver under like circumstances
would have seen, then we think it states the law correctly."' 4 Following
that rationale in the past, the court has approved the submission of the
issue of contributory negligence to the jury even in the absence of any
warning lights, 5 and on one occasion the court held the plaintiff con-
tributorily negligent as a matter of law, even though the defendant's
truck had no lights whatsoever to warn the plaintiff. 6 This modified
version of the "headlight rule" permits the submission of the issue to
the jury in light of the conditions surrounding the accident. The stand-
ard of "the reasonably prudent man" permits the jury to examine such
factors as visibility, speed, topography of the road, and color of the
vehicles.17
Various authorities have stated that the driver must exercise reason-
able vigilance or be barred from recovery. 8
14 Morehouse v. Everett, 141 Wash. 399, 407, 252 Pac. 157, 160 (1926).
'r, Heif v. Hansen & Keller Truck Co., 167 Wash. 206, 9 P.2d 110 (1932) ; Griffith
v. Thompson, 148 Wash. 243, 268 Pac. 607 (1928) ; McMorari v. Associated Oil Co.,
144 Wash. 276, 257 Pac. 846 (1927).
'6 Millspaugh v. Alert Transfer & Storage Co., 145 Wash. 111, 259 Pac. 22 (1927).
The plaintiff was held contributorily negligent due to a defective headlight upon his
car. He failed to show that his defective headlight was not a cause of the accident.
The requirement that the plaintiff make an affirmative showing that his negligence
was not a cause of the accident, demonstrates the proposition that a driver may be
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, even in the absence of a light to
warn him of the obstruction. Apparently one may only make the assumption that the
highway is unobstructed when his own vehicle has the required lights. The authority
of this case is weakened by the fact that the accident occurred on the outskirts of a
small highway town, rather than on the open highway.
'17 See Note, 27 N.C.L. Rav. 153, 155 (1948).
' E.g., "If the defendant wrongfully deals with a highway so as to make it danger-
ous for public travel, a traveler injured thereby is barred from recovery by his failure
to exercise reasonable vigilance to ascertain the condition of the highway .... [T]his
section applies not only when the defendant's wrong consists in his unauthorized inter-
ference with the highway but also when his interference is authorized, but he fails to
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One scholar has remarked, "Since a motorist is entitled to assume
that a vehicle ahead of him will show the statutory lights, it is not con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law to collide with an unlighted
vehicle, but the question is one for the jury under all the circumstances
of the case."' 9 The general consensus seems to be that the "right to
assume" is a limited right because there is a correlative duty to main-
tain a vigilance." And the best method by which to judge a driver's
conduct, in relation to the apparently contradictory "right to assume"
and "duty to maintain a vigilance," is submission of the issue to the
jury on the basis of the "reasonably prudent man" standard.
The trend in the law of torts has been to employ flexible standards,
such as that of the reasonably prudent man, so that the law will remain
more responsive to human needs." When a rigid standard is estab-
lished, "there is danger that the standard itself will in time become a
mechanical rule and embodied in our law as such to the exclusion of a
rule of reason under the pressure of these decisions.1121 Generally it is
felt that rigidity in tort law results in a restriction of accident lia-
bility, and hence undue harshness in the law. 4 The application of a
rigid standard may be referred to as being harsh, even when it tends to
encourage recovery. The application of the rigid standard espoused in
the Albert case results in such harshness to the defendant in the pres-
ent case by making it extremely difficult to establish contributory
negligence.
EDWARD B. MACKIE
exercise reasonable care to provide the guards or lights which are necessary to make
the highway safe for travel." (Emphasis added.) RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 474 & com-
ment b (1934).
19 17-18 HUDDY, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW § 152 (9th ed. 1931).
20 See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, TRIAL OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT CASES 114 (2d ed. 1941).
21 See, e.g., James, op. cit. supra note 1; BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS,
601-13 (1926) ; Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litiga-
tion, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 476 (1936).
22 See Note, 27 N.C.L. REV. 153, 157 (1948).
21 See, e.g., 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS §§ 17.1-17.6 (1956) ; James, Accident Lia-
bility: Some Wartime Developments, 55 YALE L.J. 365, 374-5 (1946).
24 "Perhaps the classic example of this unfortunate tendency is an old, ill-fated rule
of contributory negligence that required a motorist at a railroad crossing to 'stop, get
out of the car, and reconnoitre' before proceeding. It was adopted from a broad fac-
tual statement by Justice Holmes in Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66
(1927), noted 26 MicH. L. REv. 582 (1928) : 'In such circumstances it seems to us that
if a driver cannot be sure otherwise whether a train is dangerously near he must stop
and get out of his vehicle, although obviously he will not often be required to do more
than to stop and look.' Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1934), noted in 33 MICH.
L. REV. 457 (1934), repudiated the rule with a strong warning of 'the need for caution
in framing standards that amount to rules of law,' for: 'They are then, not the natural
flowerings of behavior in its customary forms, but rules artificially developed and
imposed from without." Note, 35 WASH. L. REV. 257, 259 (1960).
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Automobiles - Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine - Negli-
gence. In Moody v. Goodson the court held that by reason of the
dangerous character of automobiles, the owner-driver thereof was
chargeable at law with knowledge of operational limitations; therefore
lack of knowledge furnished no defense to liability.
The case arose in the following manner. Defendant backed her auto-
mobile out of a parking space on a steep Seattle hill and had pro-
ceeded part way down the hill when she observed a red light at an
intersection. She applied her foot brake, with no result. Her vehicle
collided with one driven by plaintiff Moody, injuring him and forcing
his automobile into the crosswalk, where it struck and killed a pedes-
trian, the intestate of plaintiff Wood. Defendant's car was equipped
with power brakes, and expert testimony was introduced tending to
prove that such brakes on the make and model car driven by defend-
ant would not function if the motor was not running, due to a defect
in the design of the braking system, and that this was the reason for
the brake failure on the occasion in question.
Defendant denied negligence in the operation of the automobile, and
affirmatively pleaded unavoidable accident due to a latent defect of
which she had no prior knowledge. The jury verdict for defendant
at the trial of the consolidated actions was reversed on appeal, and a
new trial granted.
The appellate court found error in submission to the jury of instruc-
tions relating to the defense of latent defect, since the mechanical
condition alleged to exist at the time of the accident did not conform
to well-established judicial definitions of such defects.2 The court took
note of a statutory duty to equip vehicles with adequate brakes,' but
did not expressly ground liability upon the theory that violation of
this statutory duty constituted negligence per se, although such a re-
sult had been reached in McCoy v. Courtney," subsequently cited in
the opinion on a different point. Rather, the court adverted to the
"dangerous instrumentality" doctrine, and reasoned that since an auto-
mobile can be classified as such an instrumentality, the driver should
be charged at law with knowledge of any operational defects present,
regardless of the absence of actual knowledge.
Does this reasoning permit a conclusion that the court is manifest-
ing a trend toward imposition of strict liability in such situations, or
155 Wn.2d 687, 349 P2d 731 (1960).
2 Jacklin v. North Coast Transp. Co., 165 Wash. 236, 5 P.2d 325 (1931).
3 Wash. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 269 § 34.
4 25 Wn2d 956, 172 P2d 596 (1946).
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is it merely a redefinition of existing standards of negligence as ap-
plied to automobile owners, essentially retaining the elements of for-
seeability of harm as a requisite of liability? The position heretofore
taken by the Washington court has indicated that liability for oper-
ating defectively equipped vehicles will be imposed only where the
owner knew or should reasonably be expected to have known of the
existence of the defect, and of the reasonable likelihood that it would
cause injury.'
The so-called dangerous instrumentality doctrine historically has
been employed as an adjunct of agency theory. It has been stated to
apply in situations where a master, having under his control some spe-
cially dangerous instrumentality which he is under a duty to keep with
care, delegates this duty to a servant or agent. If the duty is breached,
the master will be liable, even though injury resulted from the negli-
gence, wantonness or malice of the servant or agent.6 Traditionally
included within this category are such objects as steam locomotives,
torpedoes, and poisons.'
The applicability of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine to auto-
mobiles has been considered in a number of Washington cases." The
court has consistently refused to apply it as a foundation for vicari-
ous liability in cases presenting classic master-servant fact patterns,
where to do so would extend the liability beyond usual respondeat
superior concepts.' If the doctrine is accepted as analogous to the
strict liability imposed for the keeping of dangerous substances on
land,"0 it would seem that the court has clearly denied its validity as
to automobiles.
In cases involving bailor-bailee situations, language may be found
similar to that used in Moody v. Goodson to the effect that an auto-
mobile may under certain circumstances be a dangerous instrumen-
tality.1 Thus qualified, it is apparent that the classification of an
automobile as potentially dangerous falls far short of imposition of
strict liability, and refers only to one element considered in determin-
5 Nawrocki v. Cole, 41 Wn.2d 474, 249 P.2d 969 (1952).
6 MECHEm, AGENCY § 470 (4th ed. 1952).
PROSSER, TORTS § 63 (2d ed. 1948).
8 See, e.g., Robbins v. Hansen, 184 Wash. 677, 52 P.2d 908 (1935) ; Eastman v. Silva,
156 Wash. 613, 287 Pac. 656 (1930) ; Trotter v. Bullock, 148 Wash. 516, 269 Pac. 825
(1928) ; Moore v. Roddie, 103 Wash. 386, 174 Pac. 648 (1918), aff'd on rehearing 106
Wash. 548, 180 Pac. 879 (1919).
9 Jones v. Hoge, 47 Wash. 663, 92 Pac. 433 (1907).
10 See, e.g., discussion in Horack, The Dangerous Instrument Doctrine, 26 YALE L.J.
224 (1917).
11 See, e.g., Trotter v. Bullock, 148 Wash. 516, 269 Pac. 825 (1928) ; Jones v. Harris,
122 Wash. 69, 210 Pac. 22 (1922).
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ing negligence in fact in a given situation. Typical fact patterns in-
volve lending an automobile to one known to be intoxicated, 2 or lend-
ing an automobile known to be dangerously in need of repair.18 In such
cases liability is based on actual negligence in entrusting to a known
incompetent.
The court has seldom referred to the dangerous instrumentality doc-
trine in cases which, like Moody v. Goodson, involve no element of
vicarious liability. In the course of the Moody opinion, the court re-
ferred to Allen v. Schultz 4 in connection with the proposition- that
defendant was charged with knowledge that the brakes would not
function while the motor was not in operation. The Allen case also
involved personal injuries inflicted by an automobile on which the
braking system was inadequate. However, in that case the defendant
had testified to actual knowledge of the defective condition of his
brakes; thus liability dearly rested upon negligence in driving under
the known conditions.
Wellons v. Wiley 5 is somewhat analogous on its facts to the instant
case. There a car driven by the defendant owner left a highway as a
result of a tire blow-out. The court there said that an automobile is
not such a dangerous agency within the rule that one engaged in an
activity which involves a high degree of risk of harm to others, in spite
of all reasonable care, is strictly liable for the harm it causes. This
position is in accord with the majority of other jurisdictions."8
Looking again to the position taken by the court in Moody v. Good-
son, it is suggested that the language may be interpreted, in the light
of past holdings, as going no farther than to impose the normal duty
of care as to instrumentalities within one's exclusive control, the na-
ture of that instrumentality being simply one circumstance to be con-
sidered in determining whether the risk involved was forseeable. Thus
it would be negligent to operate a vehicle without knowledge of the
specific functional limitations it possessed, since it is forseeable that
harm may occur if loss of control results from such lack of knowledge.
Such a construction would be in harmony with the prior position of
the court.
ViRGrNiA LYqsss
22 Mitchell v. Churches, 119 Wash. 547, 206 Pac. 6 (1922).
Is Robbins v. Hansen, 184 Wash. 677, 52 P2d 908 (1935).
14 107 Wash. 393, 181 Pac. 916 (1919).
15 24 Wn.2d 543, 166 P.2d 852 (1946).
l2 Annot., 16 A.L.R. 270 (1922).
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Tort Liability of Building Contractor to Third Persons Injured
After Completion of Work. In Andrews v. Del Guzzi' the Washing-
ton court has made a small step in what Mr. Justice Cardozo has called
"the assault upon the citadel of privity (which) is proceeding in these
days apace." 2
A church in Forks, Washington contracted with Bruno and Jack
Del Guzzi for the construction of a home to be used by its pastor.
During a night some two years after the house was completed and
accepted by the church, poisonous gases from the propane gas heating
system escaped into the bedroom where the pastor and his wife were
sleeping. They later sued the contractors on the grounds that the
gases escaped as a result of defective construction of the heating ex-
haust system. The trial court found that the chimney by which the
waste products were carried away was of insufficient height, and the
absence of a cap on it to control air currents descending into the chim-
ney permitted fumes to pour down through the draft diverter for the
furnace and ultimately into the house. The primary problem faced by
the court was whether the building contractor could be held liable for
his negligent workmanship to the injured persons who were not parties
to the construction contract.
The general rule in this type of situation is based on the often criti-
cized but historically influential case of Winterbottom v. Wright,' in
which it was held that the manufacturer of a stage coach was not liable
to one not a party to the contract of sale who was injured by a negli-
gently created defect in the coach. Subsequently, privity of contract
was not only held a requisite to recovery in cases involving defective
chattels but it was generally extended to situations involving real
property and fixtures.4 The current status of the "real property situa-
tion" rule is expressed as follows:
It is a well-established general rule that, where the work of an inde-
pendent contractor is completed, turned over to, and accepted by, the
owner, the contractor is not liable to third persons for damages or in-
juries subsequently suffered by reason of the condition of the work,
even though he was negligent in carrying out the contract. ...
This rule is subject to a number of well-recognized exceptions which
1 156 Wash. Dec. 396, 353 P.2d 422 (1960).
2 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931).
3 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
4 Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1926) ; Curtain v. Somerset, 140 Pa. 70,
21 AtI. 244 (1891).
5 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 95 (1950) ; accord, Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 195, 201 (1950).
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are sufficiently broad in their application to modify it substantially.
Where the contractor has knowledge of the defect and he nevertheless
conceals it in such a manner as to approach fraud;I where there is an
implied invitation to third persons to use the facility; 7 where the use
by third parties was expectable; 8 where the defect amounts to a nui-
sance;9 where there is an implied warranty of safety;10 or where the
condition negligently created is inherently or imminently dangerous,11
liability can be found.
The general rule was accepted as the law in Washington in Thornton
v. Dow," a case which involved a defective railing around the balcony
of a public building which collapsed when a number of people leaned
over it to see the finish of a race in an indoor trackmeet. There the
court recognized the exception to the general rule in the case of things
of a noxious or dangerous kind, but said, "the thing built or con-
structed here-the armory-of course, was not of a noxious or danger-
ous kind." 3 It appeared that the court considered the "imminently or
inherently dangerous" exception to apply only to those things which
are highly dangerous even in the absence of negligent construction or
production, such as explosives or poisons in the field of chattels. If a
defective balcony railing, designed to keep people from falling to the
floor below, cannot be considered imminently dangerous, then it is
difficult to envision any type of real property that could be so classi-
fied. This is as strict a definition of "inherently or imminently danger-
ous" as it is possible to find. Just three years later, however, the court
found a situation in which that exception could be applied to a real
property situation. A contractor had graded and surfaced a street,
leaving under its surface an unexploded charge of dynamite set during
the blasting operation. A power company workman was injured when
he detonated the charge while drilling a hole for the installation of a
pole. The court did not use the reasoning reflected in Thornton v.
Dow, i.e., that a street is not inherently dangerous, but rather said
that a construction contractor is liable regardless of the absence of
privity where his negligent act is imminently dangerous to the lives of
0 Holland Furnace Co. v. Nauracaj, 105 Ind. App. 574, 14 N.E.2d 339 (1938).
7 Colbert v. Holland Furnace Co., 331 11. 78, 164 N.E. 162 (1928).
s Grodstein v. McGivern, 303 Pa. 555, 154 Atl. 794 (1931).
0 Schumacher v. Carl G. Neumann Dredging & Improvement Co., 206 Wis. 220, 239
N.W. 459 (1931).
10 Berger v. Standard Oil Co., 126 Ky. 155, 103 S.W. 245 (1907).
1Hunter v. Quality Homes, Inc., 45 Del. (6 Terry) 100, 68 A.2d 620 (1949).
1260 Wash. 622, 111 Pac. 899 (1910).
3.3Id. at 634, 111 Pac. at 904.
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third persons."4 It should be noted, however, that the case involved an
explosive, a product specifically mentioned in the leading case which
established the "inherently or imminently dangerous" exception in the
field of chattels."
In the instant case, the court reasoned that the propane gas heating
system was inherently dangerous for two reasons: it is, under certain
conditions, explosive 6 and its waste gases contain carbon monoxide
which is extremely poisonous. The language of the court indicates that
it used the definition of inherently dangerous when negligently con-
structed, rather than inherently dangerous when properly constructed.
"It would naturally follow that any defect in the construction of the
chimney which would allow carbon monoxide gas to escape into the
living quarters of respondents' house would constitute an inherently or
imminently dangerous condition."17 This is not entirely clear, however,
as in the previous sentence the court said, "in constructing a chimney
to serve a furnace using propane gas as fuel, appellants were dealing
with a dangerous product."' " It is hoped that the court did not intend
to adhere to the stricter minority standard, and in the total context it
appears that the broader definition was used.
Recognizing this extension of liability by the court, the writer of the
dissenting opinion (three other judges concurring) objected, stating:
Items which qualify as exceptions to the general rule have been limited
by the courts to those having known dangerous propensities, such as
dynamite, gunpowder, dynamite caps, and firearms. The majority cite
no authority, nor have I been able to find any, for extending the ex-
ception to the general rule of negligence to encompass facts such as
are here presented. 9
This statement ignores a great body of case law and the reasoning and
opinions of almost all writers in the field. True, there is no direct au-
thority in Washington case law, but there seem to have been no appro-
priate cases during the last forty-seven years, the time in which strict
requirements of privity have fallen into disfavor and disuse in most
other jurisdictions. The landmark decision in this "assault on the cita-
del of privity" was that written by Mr. Justice Cardozo in MacPherson
14 Wilton v. City of Spokane, 73 Wash. 619, 132 Pac. 404 (1913).
1 Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852), (where a druggist
carelessly mislabeled poison as a medicine).
16 This reasoning is of little validity as the injury was from asphyxiation, a result
not within the risk created by an explosive.
17 Andrews v. Del Guzzi, 156 Wash. Dec. 396, 403, 353 P.2d 422, 427 (1960).
18 Ibid.
19 Id. at 407, 353 P.2d at 429.
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v. Buick Motor Co.2 0 In it he said that if a thing becomes dangerous
when negligently made and it is known that it will be used by others
than the purchaser, then the maker may be held liable to the third
persons for their injuries. This decision has been greatly influential
throughout the United States. By 1943 this reasoning as applied to
chattels had been adopted wholeheartedly by the Washington court, as
manifested by its decision in Bock v. Truck & Tractor, Inc. in which
it quoted from MacPherson at length with approval, concluding that,
It thus appears to be well established in this state, and elsewhere, that
a manufacturer may be held liable, not only to his immediate vendee,
but also to third persons, for damages resulting from noxious, danger-
ous, or defective articles of merchandise which are unsafe for the pur-
poses to which they ordinarily would be put by the consumer or user
of them, or by the person who expectantly [sic] would come in contact
with them.21 (Emphasis added.)
The court quoted Mr. Justice Cardozo's definition of dangerous: "If
the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life
and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger.122
Thus it is clear that a defectively constructed chattel need not be found
inherently and imminently dangerous in order for a third person to
recover against the maker in the state of Washington. Once this step
has been taken there seems little reason not to apply the same reason-
ing to fixtures and to buildings, for in respect to this problem, at least,
distinctions between them are largely fictional."2
New York has finally carried the MacPherson v. Buick doctrine to its
logical conclusion by removing the technical distinction between real
and personal property. By destroying completely the initially irra-
tional exception to tort law of nonliability for manufacturers, con-
tractors, and architects, based on privity, the court has established that
the foreseeability of the injury complained of should be the test and
the classification of object or tortfeasor should have no bearing on the
plaintiff's right to recover. 24
Before analyzing further authorities supporting an extension of lia-
bility, it would perhaps be helpful to notice the varying degrees of
liability in the field of producers and contractors: (1) complete non-
20217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
21 Bock v. Truck & Tractor, Inc., 18 Wn2d 458, 467, 139 P.2d 706, 710 (1943).
22 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
23 Lambert, Personal Injury (Tort) Law, 18 NACCA L.J. 273, 284 (1956). The
same conclusion was reached in Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co., 49 Cal. App. 2d 720, 321 P.2d
736 (1958).24 Note. 26 FoRDHAm L. REv. 689, 694 (1958).
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liability in the absence of privity (the Winterbottom v. Wright rule);
(2) liability only where the condition or instrumentality is inherently
dangerous in the absence of negligence (as with explosives or poisons);
(3) liability where the condition or instrumentality is inherently dan-
gerous as a result of negligent construction (the position of the court
in the instant case); (4) liability where it can reasonably be foreseen
that negligent construction or production will cause injury to a third
person (MacPherson position and current Washington position in rela-
tion to chattels); and (5) absolute liability for injury (as with sup-
pliers of food).
In only a few cases25 decided in the past fifteen years have courts
applied either of the first two of these standards. By far the majority
of recent decisions have fallen within the third and fourth categories.
Those reasoning as the Washington court did in the Andrews case (the
third category)2" are about as numerous as the others, but the more
progressive view seems to be the fourth, applying the MacPherson rea-
soning." That is the view which is adopted by the American Law In-
stitute in the Restatement of Torts."
25 Watts v. Bacon & Van Buskirk Glass Co., 20 Ill. App. 2d 164, 155 N.E.2d 333
(1959) (glass door which shattered when opened) ; Miller v. Davis & Averill, Inc., 61
A.2d 253 (N.J. 1948) ; Price v. Johnston Cotton Co. of Wendell, Inc., 226 N.C. 758,
40 S.E.2d 344 (1946) (absence of allegation that defect was hidden may have been
reason for decision) ; Delaney v. Supreme Inv. Co., 251 Wis. 374, 29 N.W2d (1947)(ignored all exceptions to the rule of nonliability except where the defect creates a
nuisance).
26 Del Gaudio v. Ingerson, 142 Conn. 564, 115 A.2d 665 (1955) (defective oil burner
imminently dangerous) ; Hunter v. Quality Homes, Inc., 45 Del. (6 Terry) 100, 68
A.2d 620 (1949) (defective oil burner imminently dangerous); Cox v. Ray M. Lee
Co., 100 Ga. 333, 111 S.E.2d 246 (1959) (inclined sidewalk slick when wet may be
found by jury to qualify) ; Holland Furnace Co. v. Nauracaj, 105 Ind. App. 574, 14
N.E.2d 339 (1938) (defectively installed furnace) ; Kendrick v. Mason, 234 La. 271,
99 So. 2d 108 (1958) (sewer line which allowed seepage of natural gas) ; Holmes v.
T. M. Strider & Co., 186 Miss. 380, 189 So. 518 (1939) (insecurely fastened guard
rail on bridge) ; Greenwood v. Lyles & Buckner, Inc., 329 P.2d 1063 (Okla. 1958)
Roush v. Johnson, 139 W. Va. 607, 80 S.E.2d 857 (1954) (faulty wiring).
27 Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 166 F.2d 908 (3d Cir. 1948) (Ohio
law) ; Pastorelli v. Associated Engineers, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 159 (D. R.I. 1959) ; Mc-
Cloud v. Leavitt Corp., 79 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Ill. 1948) ; Tomchik v. Julian, 171 Cal.
App. 2d 138, 340 P.2d 72 (1959) (inherently and imminently dangerous terminology is
confusing to the jury) ; Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co., 49 Cal. App. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736(1958); Freeman v. Mazzera, 150 Cal. App. 2d 61, 309 P2d 510 (1957); Hale v.
Depaoli, 33 Cal. App. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948) (expressly rejected the contention
that the condition must be imminently dangerous) ; Slavin v. Kay, 108 So. 2d 462
(Fla. 1958); Wright v. Holland Furnace Co., Inc., 186 Minn. 265, 243 N.W. 387(1932) ; Inman v. Binghampton Housing Authority, 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164
N.YS.2d 699 (1957) (accepted the MacPherson reasoning but held there was no
liability because the defect was not hidden) ; Strothman v. Houggy, 186 Pa. Super.
638, 142 A.2d 769 (1958) ; Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517
(1949).
28 "One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any
other condition thereon is subject to liability to others within or without the land for
bodily harm caused to them by the dangerous character of the structure or condition
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Most of the writers and scholars in the field of tort law favor the
application of this standard, 9 a step beyond what the Washington
court was willing to go in the Andrews case. Dean Prosser in his work.
lists three reasons why the broader rule should be extended to con-
struction contractors: (1) the contractor, for his own economic benefit,
is engaged in a course of conduct which may affect adversely the in-
terests of others; (2) negligent performance of his work makes injury
to a particular class of people foreseeable; and (3) the owner's reli-
ance on the skill of the contractor will foreseeably prevent him from
taking special precautions." He further argues 1 that the inherently
or imminently dangerous approach (used by the Washington court) is
merely a step in the dismissal of the old general rule against liability
and the adoption of a rule analogous with that of the MacPherson case.
Various reasons have been given for not allowing a third party to
collect from a construction contractor and for adhering to the old rule
of nonliability. It has been said that there must be a present duty on
the part of the tortfeasor, and where the premises are in the possession
and control of another there cannot be such a present duty.82 The
problem of a present duty, however, is met and dismissed in the case of
chattels. The old threat that such a rule would give rise to endless
litigation has been raised,"3 but seems without effect in those jurisdic-
tions which have adopted MacPherson reasoning. It has been con-
tended that protection must be given to the building industry for
without such protection responsible builders will not remain in a busi-
ness imposing such risks. 4 Another reason given is that a contractor
has no ability to rectify the wrong after acceptance by the owner who
then assumes the duty to inspect and repair8 5 At times it is contended
that injury cannot be foreseen to others than the contractee 8l or that
after his work has been accepted by the possessor under the same rules as ... (deter-
mine) the liability of one who as manufacturer or independent contractor makes a
chattel for the use of others." RESTATEMNT, TORTS § 385 (1938).
29 See, e.g., Note, 19 LA. L. REv. 221 (1958); Note, 8 MERcER L. REv. 375 (1957);
Note, 4 ST. Louis U.L.J. 344 (1956) ; (Note, 8 SYvncusE L. REv. 95 (1956) ; Note,
31 Ttn. L. REv. 374 (1957) ; Note, 42 VA. L. REv. 403 (1956).
20 Paossm, ToRTs § 85, at 518 (2d ed. 1955).
U Id. at 518-519.
32 Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 195, 206 (1950).
3 Id.
34 Galbraith v. Illinois Steel Co., 133 Fed. 485, 489 (7th Cir. 1904). There seems to
be no evidence of such an effect in jurisdictions imposing liability.
35 Casey v. Hoover, 114 Mo. App. 47, 89 S.W. 330, 334 (1905); 13 A.L.R.2d 196,
200 (1950). Where liability is imposed, it would seem that an offer by a builder to
correct a dangerous situation created by him should absolve him from further respon-
sibility. See, Ford Motor Co. v. Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392, 192 S.W2d 840 (1946).386 Husett v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 865, 867 (8th Cir. 1903).
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maintenance of the condition by the contractee is an intervening
cause. At best these are makeweight arguments. One writer does not
find any of the usual reasons convincing, saying, "the various reasons
advanced in justification of such a result are reminiscent of the argu-
ments formerly offered in the case of manufacturer's of goods. 3
8
There are, however, a few well-accepted and seemingly valid excep-
tions to the allowance of liability. It would appear only just to exempt
the contractor from liability where the accident or injury is due pri-
marily to defective plans or specifications furnished by the employer
contractee unless the defect is so obvious as to be discoverable on a
reasonable examination; otherwise the contractor would have to deter-
mine for himself, at his own peril, whether or not the work required
by him under the contract would result in a safe structure.
Where it can be shown that the condition causing the injury was an
obvious one, or one of which the injured party knew or should have
known, then the contractor is generally not held liable for the resulting
injury.4" Though this seems clearly to be the majority rule, the Re-
statement is contra.4' Some attempt seems to have been made by the
dissenting judges in the Andrews case to use this defense, by saying
that the height of a chimney was obvious, so the defect was one that
was or should have been known. However, the adequacy of a chimney
is not only a matter of physical dimension, but also of specialized
knowledge, and though the height of the chimney was obvious, its
defectiveness as a vent was not.
Hence it would seem that none of the valid defenses applies to the
Andrews case, and that it was an appropriate one in which to find
liability. Unquestionably, in its decision the court was in accord with
the majority of other jurisdictions. However, the court adopted what
is now a minority rationale or at best that of a declining and out-of-
'3 Grodstein v. McGivern, 303 Pa. 555, 154 Atl. 794 (1931).
38 PROSSER, TORTS § 85, at 518 (2d ed. 1955). See also 2 HxA,,R & JAMES, TORTS §
18.5 (1956). But see Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 195, 196 (1950).
39 Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 195, 196-97 (1950) ; accord, Belk v. Jones Constr. Co., 272
F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1959) ; Thornton v. Dow, 60 Wash. 622, 111 Pac. 899 (1910).
40 Roman Catholic Church v. Keenan, 74 Ariz. 20, 243 P.2d 455 (1952) (pile of
pipes) ; Hogan v. Miller, 153 Cal. App. 2d 107, 314 P.2d 230 (1957) ; Leveridge v.
Lapidus, 105 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1958) (drain in the middle of an aisle-way) ; Benton
Harbor Malleable Indus., Inc. v. Pearson Constr. Co., 348 Mich. 471, 83 N.W2d 429
(1957) (one using proper care would have discovered defect) ; Wilson v. North Cen-
tral Gas Co., 163 Neb. 664, 80 N.W2d 685 (1957) (pile of dirt) ; Sarnicandro v. Lake
Developers, Inc., 55 N.J. Super. 475, 151 A.2d 48 (1959) (injured party knew of de-
fect, but occupied and used anyway) ; Clyde v. Sumerel, 233 S.C. 228, 104 S.E.2d
(1958) (display case sitting on incline).
41 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 385, 388 (1938).
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date majority. It is unfortunate that the court did not take this oppor-
tunity to approve the MacPherson reasoning in construction contract
situations. Further, it is most disturbing that the four dissenting just-
ices still would adhere to the strict reasoning that there can be liability
only where the instrumentality is imminently dangerous when properly
constructed. This position, currently rejected by most courts, is one
which should be subjected to a searching re-evaluation and should be
abandoned at the first opportunity.
There are problems, however, in connection with the application of
the modern rule, which must be considered. That they are generally
ignored is illustrated by the following comment, which though perhaps
somewhat extreme, can be characterized as generally representative of
the reaction of writers to the death of the rule of nonliability in the
absence of privity.
Obviously the contractor can protect himself by using his utmost skill
to avoid building defective structures or following defective designs
and plans. There is, in addition, the familiar fact that he can procure
liability insurance to shift his losses caused by accidents that do occur.
It is a truism to repeat that the cost of this greater degree of care and
of liability insurance can be included in the expense of the operation
and thereby be absorbed by the public. 2
The lasting nature of structures, as distinguished from most chattels,
introduces the possibility that injury may occur a considerable length
of time after construction. The first problem which this creates is that
a construction contractor may be held liable for negligence after he
has left the business. No contractor should be expected to maintain
expensive liability insurance after he has left the business, but he has
no assurance that he will not be sued after that time for defects created
years before. This situation is a result of the fact that in Washington,
and generally elsewhere, the statute of limitations does not begin to
run at the time of the negligent construction, but at the time the defect
actually causes injury. In Washington this rule was established in a
case in which an oil stove was negligently installed, but no injury
occurred for seven years. The court held that the two-year statute of
limitations did not begin to run until the date of the damage.48 Hence
all of the valid reasons supporting statutes of limitations are of no
efficacy in protecting construction contractors. The problem is not
42 Note, 24 IND. L.J. 286, 291 (1949).
-
3 Theurer v. Condon, 34 Wn.2d 448, 209 P.2d 311 (1949) ; accord, Foley v. Pitts-
burgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 68 A.2d 517 (1949).
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extreme in the Andrews case as the injury occurred only two years
after construction, so no criticism should be directed at the court for
its failure to consider the problem. But in other jurisdictions the prob-
lem is arising; in one case liability was found for an injury which
occurred eighteen years after the defective building was constructed."
The situation thus created would make it impossible to determine
whether a builder had been a financial success or failure until claims
could no longer be filed against his estate.
The second problem arises from the fact that in most if not all juris-
dictions the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (or a counterpart) is available
to the plaintiff, shifting the burden of producing evidence to the de-
fendant.45 Add to this the fact that cases involving defective building
or manufacture are "naturals" for the application of that doctrine, and
the sum is rather alarming. It is not improbable that an uninsured,
retired building contractor could be forced, practically speaking, to
prove an absence of negligence in a project completed many years
earlier, without the aid of witnesses (as the labor force in the building
industry is highly mobile) and without any clear personal recollection
of the circumstances.
One jurisdiction, some years ago, held that five years of safe use of
a machine constituted a conclusive presumption that the machine was
not imminently dangerous. 8 That court has recently retreated from
that holding, saying,
A reappraisal of the problem in the light of subsequent decisions per-
suades us to recede from the rule in Lynch, and to hold that prolonged
use of a manufactured article is but one factor, albeit an important one,
in the determination of the factual issue whether the negligent manu-
facture proximately caused the harm.47
Such a retreat is no doubt wise, as there are latent defects causing real
and substantial danger which nonetheless need not and do not injure
immediately. The later position of the court seems to be the general
rule." Further, however, than just considering the passage of time as
-4 Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. App. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948). See also International
Derrick & Equip. Co. v. Croix, 241 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1957) (seven years) ; Inman
v. Binghampton Housing Authority, 3 N.Y2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699
(1957) (six years).
45 For an explanation of the Washington position see Comment, 13 WASH. L. REV.
215 (1938). See also, 35 WASH. L. REv. 249 (1960).
46 Lynch v. International Harvester Co., 60 F.2d 223 (10th Cir. 1932) ; accord,
Solomon v. White Motor Co., 153 F. Supp. 917 (WD.Pa. 1957).
47 Pryor v. Lee C. Moore, Corp., 262 F.2d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1958).
48 Fredericks v. American Export Lines, Inc., 227 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Gor-
man v. Murphy Diesel Co., 42 Del. 149, 29 A.2d 145, 147 (1942) ; Kuhr Bros. Inc. v.
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an important factor in the determination of proximate causation or
imminent danger, the courts should give the contractor greater protec-
tion by allowing such safe protracted use to rebut the presumption of
negligence raised by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur where used, and
where not used perhaps to raise a presumption of reasonable care.
This would still leave the way to recovery open for the injured party
with a bona fide cause of action and some degree of proof upon which
to base it.
A final problem is that, under current reasoning, duties placed upon
a builder are higher than those imposed upon a landlord with respect
to tenants. Under the Andrews case a builder is liable for dangers of
which he knew or should have known,"' whereas in Washington a land-
lord has no duty "to discover and disclose obscure defects or dangers''
but only to disclose those that are actually known to him. This would
indicate a need for re-evaluation of the obligations imposed upon
landlords. 1
In all other respects, current progress in the elimination of non-
liability to persons not in privity with the contractor is salutary. The
original rule of nonliability has always been much criticized, the rea-
sons given by its apologists in the main unconvincing, and the results
reached under it often harsh. In the future when a situation arises
wherein a person not in privity with the building contractor is injured
by a negligently created condition, which though dangerous cannot be
considered imminently dangerous, it is hoped that the Washington
court will not allow itself to be shackled to the dead remains of privity
restrictions, but rather that it will clearly and articulately apply the
MacPherson principles and reasoning.
GoIUoN G. CoNGER
Spahos, 89 Ga. App. 885, 81 S.E2d 491, 494-95 (1954) ; Beadles v. Servel Inc., 344 Ill.
App. 133, 100 N.E2d 405, 412 (1951). Contra, Miller v. Davis & Averill, Inc., 61
A.2d 253 (N.J. 1948). See also Kolburn v. P. J. Walker o., 38 Cal. App. 2d 545, 101
P2d 747 (1940); Travis v. Rochester Bridge Co., 188 Ind. 79, 122 N.E. 1 (1919);
Daugherty v. Herzog, 145 Ind. 255, 44 N.E. 457 (1896); Hewitt v. General Tire &
Rubber Co., 3 Utah 2d 354, 284 P.2d 471 (1955).49 Andrews v. Del Guzzi, 156 Wash. Dec. 396, 404, 353 P2d 422, 427 (1960).
50 Howard v. Washington Water Power Co., 75 Wash. 255, 261, 134 Pac. 927, 930
(1913). See also, Bidlake v. Youell, 51 Wn2d 59, 315 P.2d 644 (1957); Mesher v.
Osborne, 75 Wash. 439, 134 Pac. 1092 (1913).
51 Erosion of that rule, already occurring is illustrated by the stretching of the term
"wanton" in Greetan v. Solomon, 47 Wn.2d 354, 287 P.2d 721 (1955).
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Silence as Fraudulent Concealment-Vendor and Purchaser-
Duty to Disclose. In Obde v. Schlemeyer,1 the Washington court held
a vendor of real property liable in damages for failure to disclose to his
purchaser, absent inquiry, the existence of a latent termite infestation
in the subject property.
Vendors concededly were aware of the presence in the residence of
the termite condition, and in fact had employed an exterminator, al-
though the recommended eradication process was not carried through
to completion. The decayed state of the dwelling was not observable
by the usual surface inspection of the premises. Plaintiffs bought the
residence several months after the initial pest control treatment, mak-
ing no inquiry as to the possible presence of termites. Upon discovery
of the condition, this action was brought against the sellers for dam-
ages represented by the difference in actual market value of the house
in its defective condition and the value of the same property if sound.
The lower court granted judgment for the plaintiffs, and the supreme
court affirmed, holding that the vendors were under a duty to disclose
the fact of termite infestation to the purchasers, and their silence con-
stituted fraudulent concealment.
In reaching this result, the court adhered to a disinclination, enun-
ciated in the past,2 to accord a rigid interpretation to the maxim caveat
emptor. Beyond this, however, the court predicated the imposition of
a positive duty of disclosure upon the exception to the rule of non-
liability for mere silence, such exception being embodied in circum-
stances entailing a latent condition "dangerous to life, health or prop-
erty." Implicit in this rather brief rationale is an underlying philoso-
phy of a heightened sense of ethical responsibility, with a consequent
demand that relief be granted in situations not traditionally within the
protected ambit. The "dangerous to health, life or property" exception
thus provided a convenient peg upon which to hang the liability dic-
tated by what might be termed public conscience.
The issues here involved raise two questions: May silence alone be
the basis for an action for fraud and deceit, and if so, under what cir-
cumstances?
The general requisites for maintenance of an action on the theory of
fraud are well settled in this state3 as necessitating (1) representations
as to a material matter; (2) which matter is in fact false; (3) knowl-
1156 Wash. Dec. 463, 353 P.2d 672 (1960).
2 Wooddy v. Benton Water Co., 54 Wash. 124, 102 Pac. 1054 (1909).
3 Hamilton v. Mihills, 92 Wash. 675, 159 Pac. 887 (1916).
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edge of the maker as to its falsity; (4) intent on the part of the maker
that the other party should act upon such representations; and (5)
actual reliance by the other party, to his injury.
A representation may be by means of words spoken or written, or
any other conduct which amounts to an assertion not in accordance
with the truth.4 "Any other conduct" could conceivably be interpreted
as including silence; however, conventionally the rule is stated to be
that silence alone is not representation-to constitute fraud by con-
cealment or suppression of the truth there must be something more.'
In the case of Kelley v. von Herberg6 the Washington court declared
itself firmly committed to the doctrine that as between parties dealing
at arm's length, silence on the part of one having knowledge is not
actionable. In the same case, however, the court conceded that con-
cealment of a material fact may constitute fraud, although only, of
course, where there is a duty to speak.7 And in a later case8 the court,
by way of dicta, remarked that a duty to speak sometimes does arise
even when the parties are dealing at arm's length. The duty is readily
apparent in situations involving fiduciary or confidential relationships,9
and has been imposed generally in situations where a partial disclosure
has been made." The Restatement of Torts adds situations where sub-
sequently acquired information requires that a representation previ-
ously made be corrected, or where it appears that the other party is
about to rely on information not imparted for that purpose."
The court in the Obde case cited Perkins v. Marsh2 as authority for
the imposition of a duty to speak. That case involved an action by a
landlord for rent due under a lease, to which was interposed the de-
fense of constructive eviction, and a cross-complaint for damages suf-
fered by reason of the defective condition of the premises. A building
had been leased as an automobile salesroom, the basement to be used
for storage of used cars. The lessor knew that the basement was con-
tinually flooded during the rainy season, but this fact could not be dis-
covered by the tenant's inspection during the summer. On appeal the
court held that although there is no implied warranty of fitness for use
4 RsTATEMqENT, TORTS § 525, comment b (1938).
5Farmers State Bank v. Lamon, 132 Wash. 369, 231 Pac. 952 (1925).
6 184 Wash. 165, 50 P.2d 23 (1935).
7Id. at 174, 50 P.2d at 27.8 Oates v. Taylor, 31 Wn.2d 898, 904, 199 P.2d 924, 928 (1948).
9 See, e.g., Oates v. Taylor, 31 Wn.2d 898, 199 P.2d 924 (1948).
1o See, e.g., Ikeda v. Curtis, 43 Wn2d 449, 261 P.2d 684 (1953).
"1 ZESTATEmENT, TORTS § 551 (1938).
12 179 Wash. 362, 37 P2d 689 (1934).
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of demised premises, a landlord has a duty to disclose to a prospective
tenant the existence of concealed defects in the premises dangerous to
the property, health or life of the tenant, where the landlord knows of
the condition and a careful inspection by the tenant would not disclose
it. The holding in the Perkins case, however, went no further than to
excuse the tenant from liability for rent under the lease. Although the
court stated that it was the duty of the landlord to disclose these de-
fects, the defendant was denied recovery on his cross-claim for dam-
ages. Hence by using the Perkins case as a basis for the instant
decision, the Washington court has adroitly stepped from a defensive
to an affirmative posture.
The decision in the Obde case therefore represents a broadening of
the duties of a vendor with respect to disclosure. The standard fur-
nished by the court for imposition of this duty to speak, in the court's
words, "whenever justice equity and fair dealing demand it,"'" presents
a somewhat nebulous standard, praiseworthy as looking toward more
stringent business ethics, but possibly difficult of practical application.
Although no Washington cases have been found dealing with the
precise fact situation presented by the Obde case, numerous examples
have confronted courts in other jurisdictions. The Washington court
expressly refused to follow the case most often cited on the point-
Swinton v. Whitinsville Say. Bank. 4 In that case a purchaser was re-
fused relief in damages due to a concealed termite condition known to
the vendor. The result is characterized by Dean Prosser as "outra-
geous,"1 but Massachusetts courts have continued to follow it." An
opposite result was reached in a Michigan case;' 7 however, that holding
could have been based on the "partial disclosure" exception to the rule
of nonliability for silence, 8 since evidence appeared from which it
could have been found that the prospective purchaser had inquired
regarding termite possibilities and had been given an ambiguous an-
swer. Perhaps the most extreme result is furnished by a Florida case"9
in which the court refused to allow damages even though an express
representation had been made to the purchaser that the structure was
1O 0bde v. Schlemeyer, 156 Wash. Dec. 463, 467, 353 P.2d 672, 675 (1960), quoting
from Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEXAS L. REv. 1, 14
(1936).
14 311 Mass. 677, 42 N.E.2d 808 (1942).
15 PROSSER, TORTS § 87 n. 23 (2d ed. 1948).
16 Yaghsizian v. Saliba, 338 Mass. 794, 155 N.E.2d 874 (1959).
"7 Sullivan v. Ulrich, 326 Mich. 218, 40 N.W2d 126 (1949).
18 Ikeda v. Curtis, 43 Wn.2d 449, 261 P.2d 684 (1953).
'9 Davis v. Dunn, 58 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1952).
[VOL. 36
WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1960
free of termites. The Florida court took the position that an independ-
ent examination should have been made by the purchaser despite these
representations, even to the extent of breaking into stucco walls.
In the cases above referred to, the proposition reflected in the Obde
case, that concealed defects dangerous to health, life or property im-
pose a duty of disclosure upon a vendor of real property, was not dis-
cussed. However, the argument has been pursued successfully in a line
of Kentucky cases, culminating in Kaze v. Compton. °
The holding in the Obde case appears to emphasize a Willingness on
the part of the court to transcend the traditional limitations on liability
for nondisclosure in arm's length transactions. The case, if viewed as
being limited to its facts, stands only for imposition of a duty on the
part of a vendor to disclose to a prospective purchaser of real property
the presence of non-apparent termite infestations, such infestations
constituting per se defects which are dangerous to life, health or prop-
erty. The case might be viewed, however, as a concrete manifestation
of the court's ability to place liability where considerations of fair
dealing indicate it should lie, by the mechanism of labeling specific
factual patterns arising in the vendor-purchaser interchange as consti-
tuting conditions dangerous to life, health or property. The practi-
tioner confronted with a purchaser-client who has been defrauded
through silence might well investigate the possibility of utilizing the
danger-to-property route to recovery.
ViRGiNiA Lyxss
TRUSTS
Doctrine of Cy Pres-General Charitable Intent. In the recent
case of Puget Sound Nat'l Bank v. Easterday1 the Washington Su-
preme Court, for the first time, applied the doctrine of judicial cy pres.
The doctrine provides that
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable
purpose, and it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to
carry out the particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more
general intention to devote the property to charitable purposes, the
trust will not fail but the court will direct the application of the prop-
erty to some charitable purpose which falls within the general chari-
table intention of the settlor.2
In the Puget Sound case, the testator provided in his will that a cer-
20 283 S.W2d 204 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955).
1155 Wash. Dec. 898, 350 P2d 444 (1960).
2 RESTATEMNT (SEcoND), TRuSTS § 399 (1959).
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